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ABSTRACT 
With the 2008 EU’s CAP reform the governance of the EU’s dairy sector changes. 
This paper focuses on governance structures between dairy farms and milk processors. 
To get insight in regional differences within the EU, a literature research and 
interviews are conducted in three case study areas, namely: the Netherlands, Bulgaria 
and France. Results show that in these countries both farmers and processors have 
incentives to form hybrid governance structures with a higher level of control 
compared to the current structures. Most dairy cooperatives have no additional 
advantage in managing milk quality and milk supply compared to investor owned 
firms. Chain integration could go a step further in Bulgaria compared to the 
Netherlands and France given the institutional environment that is not expected to 
guarantee milk quality and the focus on the export of milk.  
 
Keywords: Agricultural Markets, Marketing, Governance and Cooperatives. 
 
 




Dairy farming and milk processing require large asset specific investments 
(HENRIKSEN 1999). Given that milk is a highly perishable product it is processed in 
production areas. Only processed milk is traded over long distances e.g. in the form of 
cheese, butter and milk powder. Prices in the different markets for dairy products 
might vary significantly. Hence, it is rather difficult and costly for an individual 
farmer to obtain correct market information (HOBBS 2004). Farmers therefore at best 
can negotiate on the terms of milk supply with processors where asset specificity 
weakens their bargaining position. The specific characteristics of the dairy sector have 
influenced the governance of the dairy sector and in some cases (e.g. in Denmark) 
positively contributed to the development of dairy cooperatives (HENRIKSEN 1999).  
 
Another factor influencing the governance structure is the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the EU. The CAP has by means of price support and supply quotas a 
large influence on production, structure and profitability of the dairy sector. However, 
as a consequence of the Health Check in 2008 dairy policies are reformed. With the 
gradual increase in milk quota, the reduction of intervention levels for dairy products, 
the phasing out of export subsidies and in the abolishment of the milk quotas in 2014, 
the EU dairy sector is approaching a new market situation in which it will need to 
address new challenges. Milk prices are expected to fluctuate more with an average 
milk price lower than in the past decade (BOUAMRA  MECHEMACHE  et al. 2008). 
Because of the lower price level and with increased opportunities for farmers to 
expand and reorganize production, there is within the EU a restructuring of dairy 
farming expected.  
 
Milk processors could also experience a very different supply situation, as deliveries 
to certain factories or even complete companies might change significantly in a 
relatively short period of time. Also, the institutional environment in which they are 
functioning will change because production can increase as supply quota will not be 
legally binding. TACKEN et al. (2009) indicate that the restructuring of dairy farming 
might put more pressure on the competitiveness of the EU milk processing sector, 
which currently is slightly below world average. BEKKUM AND NILSSON (2002) argue 
that it might be rational for the EU dairy cooperatives, to respond differently to 
identical changes in their institutional environment. In addition, RAFAT (2009) argues 
that differences between cooperatives and investor owned firms have implications for 
their flexibility to cope with the challenges ahead and to accommodate the effects of 
the policy changes in the EU.  
 
Given the change in the CAP the question is how farmers and processors change the 
governance in the dairy sector. The objective of this paper is therefore an analysis of 
the governance structure between farmers and milk processors as a result of the 
change in the CAP. It is hypothesised that the reaction of the dairy sector may vary 
between regions in the EU. To answer the research objective a literature research and 
interviews are conducted in three case study areas, namely: the Netherlands, Bulgaria 
and France. Using transaction costs economics we will characterize expected 
governance structures.  
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Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework. The empirical methodology and data 




2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Several studies have discussed the governance of agrifood chains, paying attention to 
the specific characteristics of these chains (e.g. COOK et al. 2008, RAYNAUD et al. 
2008). Food and agricultural commodities have unique characteristics. Production of 
agricultural commodities is dependent on seasonality, weather conditions and 
potential hazards such as the occurrence of diseases. This brings high levels of 
uncertainty and physical, site and temporal asset specificity (COOK et al. 2008). The 
asymmetric information about the condition of agricultural products, combined with 
the fact that the products are perishable and the fragmented production of agricultural 
commodities (large numbers relatively small dairy farmers), makes food quality and 
food safety a large concern for food processing companies (RAYNAUD et al. 2008). 
 
Experiences with the privatization of public sectors such as the energy- and water 
industries, learn us that new forms of governance can be expected to replace the 
current public forms of governance. These experiences with privatization as a form of 
deregulation learned us as that privatization not always is a success (JOSKOW AND 
PARSONS 2008). Next to that, ARGYRES and PORTER LIEBESKIND (1999) argue, prior 
contractual commitments made by a company can limit its ability to differentiate or 
change its governance arrangements in the future. The current structure of the milk 
processing industry also is of influence of the development of the industry. A major 
objective of studying regulation is to understand its impact, the range of likely 
responses, and how these play out over time (BENHAM 2005). These changes can be 
path dependent and vary across individual firms and countries. Policies will give 
incentives to stakeholders to organize themselves and to influence decisions. Sugar 
production in the U.S. offers an example of downstream impact of initial regulatory 
decisions. Once a very complex sugar program was in place, a network of program 
specialists arose in government and industry and became independently influentional. 
Fe 
 
However, not much is researched on the change in governance in the EU dairy sector 
as a consequence of the diminishing influence of the CAP. Within the EU dairy sector 
several levels on governance can be distinguished. First, there is the dairy sector on 
EU level and all linked international trade and EU policies. Below this level we can 
distinguish national levels in which public and private governance differs per country. 
Within countries regional milk markets can exist. The lowest level distinguished is 
that of individual dairy companies and their supplying dairy farmers. In this paper we 
will focus on this latter level.  
 
According to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) dairy processors and farmers can 
organize transactions among them in different ways. The main message of TCE 
concerning this choice is that transaction costs arise in connection with the exchange 
process, and that their magnitude affects the ways in which economic activity is 
organised and carried out (cf. FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997). Examples of categories 
of transaction costs are search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
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and pricing and enforcement costs. The central idea of Williamson is that when any 
transaction is described in terms of three key dimensions, it maps the most efficient 
institutional arrangement (HÖLMSTROM and ROBERTS 1998). These dimensions are 
frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity (cf. WILLIAMSON 1996; cf. Williamson 
1998). Within TCE it is assumed that transaction costs are linked directly to these 
dimensions. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed 
to alternative uses, and by alternative users, without sacrifice of productive value (cf. 
WILLIAMSON, 1996). Two types of asset specificity can be added: connectedness to 
other transactions and inseparability of previous contractual commitments. 
Connectness defines to which degree the dependency of transactions on each other 
influences the costs parties have to make to agree on their choices and to coordinate 
activities (GONZÁLES-DIAS and VÁZQUEZ 2008). Governance inseparability defines to 
which extend prior contractual commitments limit the ability to differentiate or 
change governance arrangements in the future (cf. ARGYRES and PORTER LIEBESKIND 
1999).  
 
Uncertainty can be related to demand uncertainty (demand on markets can vary over 
time); to technology uncertainty (changes in the production process, new alternatives) 
and uncertainty on suppliers (varying supply, information asymmetry) (GONZÁLES-
DIAS and VÁZQUEZ 2008). The frequency of a transaction matters because the more 
often a transaction takes place, the more widely are spread (over different transactions) 
the fixed transaction costs of establishing a non-market governance system. In general, 
the first transaction requires the highest transaction costs, since for this transaction all 
details of the transaction have to be defined, while at the next transaction, many 
details already are defined. Therefore, in general, increasing the frequency of 
transactions lowers the marginal transaction cost. Connected to this, the transaction 
costs increase with transactions for a longer period of time as these transactions 
require negotiation on more details than short-term transactions.  
 
The coordination between suppliers and buyers is of great importance. Coordination 
costs occur when downstream companies and their different input suppliers not 
effectively coordinate with each other, when failing to achieve the right relationship 
between parties. These coordination costs can be reduced when the process is 
normalized through the creation of routines (cf. GONZÁLES-DIAS and VÁZQUEZ 2008). 
 
Measurement means quantifying the attributes or dimension of a transaction. In fact, 
what is exchanged among parties in a transaction is a bundle of rights that measure 
various attributes of the goods and services exchanged or of the performance of agents 
(cf. NORTH  1986). Problems and costs of measurement pervade significantly and 
affect all economic transactions (cf. BARZEL 1982). Some dimensions have a natural 
measure such as the financial compensation or duration. Other dimensions are not 
continuously measurable, but are discrete choice variables, such as the decision to use 
a standard provision or a penalty clause. Dimensions like the landscape attributes of 
milk are even more difficult to measure. When parties have difficulties to define the 
output or measure the output this increases the risk of opportunism and thereby the 
transaction costs (GONZÁLEZ-DIAZ and VÁZQUEZ 2008).  
 
Moreover, none of the central hypotheses of contract theory is immune to chronic 
measurement problems (LYONS 1996). Transaction cost hypotheses require data on 
organisation form as well as detailed information about the character of transactions 
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as: the level of uncertainty associated with exchange, the complexity of products and 
processes, and the extent to which the required assets are specific to the particular 
relation (MASTEN 1996). Also the contracting parties themselves are confronted with 
these measurement problems, although they might perceive these in a different way. 
Measurement problems are one of the causes of incomplete contracting because the 
contracting parties are not able to write a clear and enforceable contract. These 
incomplete contracts may lead to opportunistic behaviour concerning execution of the 
contract or investments. For instance, in the case of incomplete contracts between 
processors and farmers, future development of consumer prices cannot be fully 
specified. In a period of low prices buyers have an interest in a long term contract 
whereas sellers, depending on their expectations concerning prices, possibly have an 
incentive to negotiate short term contracts.  
 
As mentioned the selection of an appropriate institutional arrangement from a 
transaction costs economics point of view is based on asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency of the transaction. To simplify, the evolution of the choice on 
governance to minimize transaction costs can be derived by defining the production 
cost differences and the governance costs differences as functions of the dimensions 
of transaction costs (T). Where ∆C = f (T) the production cost difference between 
internal organization and the market, and ∆G = g (T), the corresponding governance 
cost difference. When the sum of ∆C + ∆G is positive, the market is the most 
attractive choice, ∆C + ∆G = 0 reflects indifference between the governance 
structures, and internal governance is preferred when ∆C + ∆G<0. Hybrids (e.g. 
supply contracts), market preserving credible contracting modes that posses adaptive 
attributes located between classical markets and hierarchies (cf. WILLIAMSON 2002), 
give incentives to both intensity and administrative control. WILLIAMSON (1981) 
argues, that if assets are nonspecific, markets will have the advantage in both 
production cost as governance cost. Markets can aggregate uncorrelated demands and 
hence can realize risk pooling benefits and can mitigate risk connected to bargaining 
power and information asymmetry. When assets become more specific, exchanges 
increasingly will have a bilateral character. The aggregation benefits of markets are 
reduced and the governance cost of market governance will increase significantly. 
Therefore, market governance is expected in cases where assets are nonspecific to 
trading parties; semi specific assets are expected to result in bilateral or obligatory 
market contracting and assets with a highly specific character are expected to lead to 
an internal organization that displaces markets. Hybrid arrangements tend to develop 
specific modes of governance with significant variances in the degree of control over 
partners. The degree of control depends on the degree of uncertainty and the nature 
and degree of specific investments that is required by the transactions at stake (see 
MÉNARD 2007). In the interviews, long term contracts regularly were indicated as  
expected form of governance in the dairy sector. In this paper, we will define a long 
term contract as a contract between an individual farmer and processor that prescribes 
milk quality, milk quantity and milk price for a specific period of time. 
 
There exist different institutional arrangements (contracts) in the same institutional 
environment and the institutional environment influences the performance and 
duration of contracts (cf. MÉNARD 2000). It is not easy to obtain measures of the 
relevant dimensions of the institutional environment that enable us to isolate its 
impact on institutional arrangements (OXLEY 1999). The institutional environment is 
analysed by using the following two characteristics: place: the institutional 
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environment differs among communities; time: the institutional environment is not 
fixed in time and changes in general slowly. 
 
The first characteristic is that the institutional environment differs among different 
communities (e.g. countries, provinces and regions). For instance, the existence of 
norms in the society as a part of the institutional environment in which an 
organisation is active influences the relative performance of this organisation. The 
institutional environment differs for dairy farmers in the sense that (1) many EU 
guidelines are translated in (differing) legislation on national level, (2) enforcement is 
provided by (different) public authorities and (3) the business environment is 
appertain to the different case study areas. HOFSTEDE and MCCRAE (2004) showed 
that personality traits, correlated with culture, influence the business environment of 
countries.  
 
A second characteristic is that the institutional environment is not constant in time. In 
a single community only changes in the institutional environment in time can be 
observed. According to WILLIAMSON (1998) the institutional environment changes 
considerably in a period of 10 - 100 years. For instance, the recognition of property 
rights (part of the institutional environment) is not immutable. They may, for example, 
change from one generation to another (COOTER and ULEN 1997). This can have 
consequences for the way in which the government recognises and protects assets. 
Property is a bundle of rights which describes what people may and may not do with 
the resources they own; the extent to which they may possess, use, transform, transfer, 
or exclude others from their property. Property rights can be altered by changes in law. 
 
The legal system is a framework which defines the ways in which property rights can 
be implemented and enforced (MÉNARD 1995). Laws that regulate transfers, as well as 
the procedures and mechanisms for implementing and enforcing these laws, are 
central to the effectiveness of contracts (MÉNARD 2000). Perfect institutional 
environments do not exist; for instance court order issuing procedures are not perfect. 
Public ordering defines rules of the game for private ordering and a series of 
mechanisms explicitly designed to enforce contracts and to support transactions (cf. 
MÉNARD 2000).  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
To get insight in regional differences within the EU, a literature research is conducted 
on the structure of the dairy sector in three of the case studies: the Netherlands, 
Bulgaria and France. Table 1 gives an overview of some of the averages per farm in 
the case studies and the change over time. Table 2 gives an overview of the 
production and export of dairy products per country. Annex 1 gives more information 
on the structure of the milk processing industry in the case study areas. The countries 
were selected because of characteristics of the dairy sector. In the Netherlands, the 
dairy farms are capital intensive, land intensive and relatively large (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 2009). The Netherlands is export oriented. Cheese is the largest output. 
There are only a few processors. More than 90% of all milk is processed by 
cooperatives (PZ 2009). French farms mainly are diversified and extensive. The 
French dairy sector had a relatively low restructuring rate (PERROT et al. 2009). The 
milk processing industry is characterized by the production of diversified products by 
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many processors. Approximately 45% of all milk is collected by cooperatives while 
34% is processed by cooperatives (ORLAIT 2005). Bulgaria has more than 150,000 
small farmers with in general 1-2 dairy cows (MAF 2007). Only 20% of the produced 
milk is delivered to processors. This milk mainly is produced by larger farms. The 
remaining 80% is produced for self consumption or for the local market. There are 
many small scale local processors present and a few international large scale 
processors (DRIES et al. 2008). There are no Bulgarian cooperatives processing milk. 
 
Table 1:  Averages per farm and average change over time in the selected 
case study areas. 
 EU-15  The 
Netherlands 
France Bulgaria 







Sample farms   8933  -11% 337 -11% 1150 -11% 
Farms represented   289297  -19% 19422 -24% 63643 -10%  152000
Forage area in ha  45  22% 44 21% 57 20%  4.8
Dairy cows in LU  49  19% 72 18% 43 13%  2.3
Land in own 
occupation - % 
39% -12% 63% -4% 13% -28% 
Total labour in 
AWU 
1.9 4% 1.6 0% 1.7 5% 
Family labour in  
AWU 
1.6 -1% 1.5 -2% 1.6 3% 
Milk yield – 
kg/cow 
6973 9% 7800 2% 6423 7%  3541
Milk production in 
tons 
339 29% 564 20% 279 21%  8
FNVA/AWU 31549  24% 55435 11% 23821 5%  5244
Notes: AWU = annual work unit; and FNVA/AWU = net value added per labour unit 
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2009 
 
Table 2:  Production of dairy products in 2007 in 1000 tons and exports in 
tons per selected country. 
  The Netherlands France  Bulgaria 
Cheese produced  732.0  1754.7  68.6 
Cheese exported   562.6  650.7  16.0 
Fresh milk produced  750.0  3764.0  337.2 
Fresh milk exported  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Butter and –oil produced  129.2  337.2  1.4 
Butter and –oil exported  154.0  62.8  1.1 
Condensated  milk  produced  330.7 65.7 0.4 
Condensated milk exported  274.0  70.7  77.0 
Milk powder produced  1009.0  181.5  193.3 
Milk powder exported   151.5  249.5  n.a. 
Notes: n.a. = not available; and skimmed and non skimmed milk powder are together 
Source: PZ, 2009 
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Interviews with experts and stakeholders of the dairy sector in the case studies were 
used to get insight in their expectations towards the governance in the sector as a 
result of the CAP reform. 20 semi-structured interviews were hold in France and the 
Netherlands. In Bulgaria, 1 semi structured interview and 14 surveys with open 
questions were hold. The explanation on the survey questions took place during a 
short presentation given to the respondents. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
interviewed persons, in this paper further referred as ‘respondents’. The interviews 
were analysed by coding the findings from the interviews systematically into the core 
categories that together hold a coherent framework using the grounded theory as 
described in NEERGAARD and ULHØI (2007). In the first phase, open coding, 
categories were named and their properties and dimensions determined. In the second 
phase, axial coding, categories were linked at the level of dimensions and properties. 
In the third phase, selective coding, the core categories were refined to integrate them 
into a coherent framework. No distinct differences were found in perception of 
specific interviewed subgroups on the core categories.  
 
Table 3: Overview of interviews; divided in subcategories 





France 3  2  5  10 
Bulgaria 4  2  9  15 
Netherlands 3 3 4  10 
Total 10  7  18  35 
Source: Project for European Commission with title “Assessing the multiple Impacts 





4.1  Interviews 
 
The expectations of the respondents from the selected case study areas are 
summarized in Table 4. Most respondents in France and the Netherlands expect that 
the first years after 2013, the rate of restructuring will increase and farms will increase 
scale relatively fast and specialize further. The Bulgarian respondents expect small 
farming to disappear and expect the dairy sector to specialize and restructure 
expeditiously. Most interviewed experts and stakeholders indicate prices of dairy 
products on the international market will show larger fluctuations. The expectations 
on the development of the governance of the dairy sector however differ between the 
case study areas.  
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Table 4:  Expectations of stakeholders and experts on governance of milk 
supply and processor’s strategy with the abolition of milk quota 
  Relation processor-
farmer 




France    Long term contracts 
  No major changes 



















  Increase 




















 Milk price ad-
justment in contract 
on monthly basis  





 No major changes 
in requirements on 
physical milk 
quality  




















Bulgaria   Continuation of 
long-term contracts 
 Increase of milk 
processed by 
processors (instead 
of direct marketing) 




 Increase of chain 
integration. 
















  Increase 
value added 
products 





Source: Project for European Commission with title “Assessing the multiple Impacts 
of the Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) on Rural Economies” (CAP-IRE), 2009 
                                                 
1Indicators of the physical milk quality of milk are taste, smell and exterior. Factors that might 
influence the experience or credence attributes influencing the milk quality such as standards on animal 
welfare and environment are not included. 
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In the Netherlands respondents strongly indicate that the cooperatives feel the 
obligation to collect all milk supplied by their members. Many Dutch dairy farmers 
currently feel limited by the production constraints from the quota. They are expected 
to increase scale, until other factors affecting their production will become limiting. 
They indicate this would be environmental and labour constraints. The dairy 
cooperatives in the Netherlands (>90% of all milk is supplied to cooperatives) are 
expected to process the milk and market it as profitable as possible paying the highest 
possible price to their dairy farmers.  
 
Respondents expect processors in France to negotiate long-term contracts with their 
suppliers. Processors will increase their attention to logistical efficiency. The potential 
concentration of milk production in certain parts of France and the disappearance in 
other parts, is considered as an undesirable development and they indicate the 
government shares this opinion. The costs attached to landscape protection might 
increase greatly with the disappearance of dairy in certain part of France. To protect 
processing companies from the termination of milk collection in less efficient regions, 
there currently are ideas to impose national guidelines for milk supply contracts 
between farmers and processors.  
 
Long term contracts are already frequently used in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian 
respondents indicate to expect that production standards for physical milk quality will 
increase. From some of the Bulgarian respondents and from the literature (see e.g. 
DRIES et al., 2008: 23) follows, that many Bulgarian milk processors experience 
shortage of high quality milk. Processors in Bulgaria focus on assuring the quality 
standards of the EU and are expected to try to decrease the costs accompanied with 
this. From the literature follows that some milk processors have set up their own dairy 
farms (see DRIES et al., 2008). Also from the interviews follows that some 





In the Netherlands, where more than 90% of all supplied milk is processed by 
cooperatives, milk prices paid out to farmers currently are determined by the 
international market for dairy products and adjusted on monthly base. Friesland 
Campina, the main cooperative, pays according to her company performance, a 
premium on the end of the milk year. Quantity is determined by the supply quotas of 
farmers. This could be regarded as a hybrid with a relatively low level of control. 
Transaction costs are expected to go up with the increasing levels of asset specificity 
and uncertainty. However, when farmers and processors after abolition of the quota, 
as currently is expected by the respondents, will not contract the supply quantity 
and/or price, this leads to a hybrid with a lower level of control than the current hybrid. 
There are several explanations why the Dutch dairy sector would not prefer a higher 
level of control. Firstly, farmers could underestimate the increase in uncertainty. For 
instance, it could be that farmers do not expect large price fluctuations. However this 
is against our results from the interviews. Secondly, farmers could be able to handle 
large price fluctuations efficiently (against low costs); for instance because (1) they 
have (or they expect to have) access to capital to overcome temporarily income 
shortages at low costs or (2) because they are able (or expect to be able) to have an 
insurance against temporarily income shortages at low costs (e.g. a private insurance 
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or temporarily income security given by the government or the EU). A third 
explanation might be that farmers do not trust milk processors. For instance, 
processors could behave opportunistically because (1) of (perceived) bargaining 
power since the farmer might have limited alternatives or (2) because of the 
incapability to measure correctly the experience and credence attributes of milk 
(HOBBS, 2004). From WILLIAMSON (2004) follows that it would not be logical for 
milk processors to break the contract, since opportunism would negatively damage 
their reputation. Because of the recurring character of the transaction, reputation is of 
great importance for the processors. For cooperatives, with their suppliers as 
shareholders, one could expect this would even more negatively affect their reputation 
and might damage the trust of the members, which hold shares in the cooperative. But 
if farmers look with suspicion to processors and processors cannot show that they 
behave according to the contract (thus, the costs to persuade farmers are very high), 
farmers can interpret this as ‘bad behaviour. A fourth explanation is that milk 
processors have no incentive for increased levels of control. The negotiation costs for 
milk processors could be considered higher than the costs of supply uncertainty. It is 
costly to renegotiate prices in contracts with frequently changing market prices for 
dairy products. Following the market prices could be a less costly solution. Also, 
cooperatives, formed to represent the interests of their members, historically have 
been considered to represent these interests by processing all milk their members 
supply, hereby guarantying to pay the highest possible milk price to their farmers. It 
could be too costly to change this strategy (e.g. chance on strikes, members that stop 
delivering, costs of informing members etc.), even while hybrids with higher levels of 
control, for instance long-term contracts, would be in the interest of their members. 
Next to that, none of respondents expected large differences in the geographical 
distribution of farms or problems related to location-specific undersupply of milk in 
the Netherlands. Respondents indicated not to expect problems with the quality of 
milk supplied by the Dutch dairy farmers and dairy farms do not show very large 
seasonal fluctuations in production (however there is some). This might decrease the 
incentive for milk processors in the Netherlands to negotiate hybrids with higher 
levels of control to reduce the processors’ uncertainty on milk quantity and quality.  
 
In France, where 45% of all milk is collected by cooperatives, the respondents 
indicate to expect that milk supply will be regulated by long-term contracts, which 
can be defined as hybrids with high levels of control. This development is expected to 
be followed by private companies as well as by cooperatives. Several explanations 
can be given why this expectation is different from the expectation in the Netherlands. 
Firstly, the costs of an increase in uncertainty could be larger because (1) French dairy 
farmers have (or perceive to have) less efficient instruments to handle price 
fluctuations or (2) because French dairy farmers in general are expected to be less 
competitive in the future compared to Dutch dairy farmers. French farmers are 
therefore more vulnerable to milk price fluctuations. As follows from Table 1, French 
dairy farmers on average have a lower income per labour unit than Dutch dairy 
farmers. Also, larger differences in farm structure and farm performance are expected 
in France (see e.g. PERROT et al., 2009). Secondly the incentive for processors to 
contract milk supply could larger in France than in the Netherlands because there is 
more need to control milk supply. This is because a much larger percentage of the 
production is processed into dairy products for domestic consumption. Considering 
exports, a much larger percentage is in dairy specialties such as special cheeses. 
Although processors are very diverse, most French milk processors are more focused 
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on meeting specific market demands than on producing for commodity markets, 
which increases the incentive to control supply. This also might decrease the effects 
of price fluctuations on the international markets for dairy products on company 
performance, and hereby the frequency supply contracts need to be renegotiated and 
the costs to renegotiate these contracts. A third explanation is that processors have a 
larger incentive to use contracts to guarantee the milk supply to their factories. Almost 
all interviewed respondents indicate that the development of the sector will greatly 
differ between regions within France. While historically because of regional 
regulation of the milk quota, dairy farms developed rather homogeneous between 
regions, after the abolishment certain regions of France are expected to be more 
favourable for further development of the dairy sector, while other parts will be less 
interesting for dairy farming. The spatial concentration of farms is important while it 
may alter the logistical efficiency for a processor in a certain region. However, dairy 
farms are still present and also specific investments in dairy processing plants have 
been made in these regions leading to path dependency.  
 
On the other hand, the collection of milk in certain areas of France might become 
uninteresting for milk processors. Respondents expect given the French policy that 
tries to combine agricultural land use with landscape stewardship, the French 
government to have an interest in the maintenance of dairy farming in several areas 
that are economically less attractive for future dairy farming. This might lead to the 
introduction of national guidelines, obliging milk processors to collect milk from all 
farms in France. This security might give individual farmers in these areas sufficient 
incentives to continue dairy farming.  
 
In Bulgaria, milk processors and farmers quite regularly have long-term contracts on 
milk supply and most respondents indicate to expect this will increase further in the 
future. Some respondents indicate to expect further chain integration. The shortage of 
milk supply of high quality increases the incentive for milk processors to secure their 
milk supply. While the respondents indicate that there are no problems with milk 
quality in France and the Netherlands, the physical quality of milk is a major point of 
attention in Bulgaria and brings high monitoring costs. Next to that, DRIES et al. (2008) 
argue that processors experience opportunism of farmers, as farmers not always meet 
contractual agreements and easily change processor. The institutional environment is 
not expected to guarantee supply of milk with the demanded quality in Bulgaria. 
Corruption, fraud and deficiencies in the court system are common in Bulgaria and 
are therefore probably limiting the enforcement of contracts and regulation. Also, 
exporting processors demand milk meeting quality standards superior to the national 
standards (BACHEV, 2007). The chain integration therefore could go a step further 





Uncertainty about income from dairy farming will increase with increasing price 
fluctuations as result of the changing CAP in France, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. 
With the abolition of the milk quota, milk processors are expected to face an increase 
in uncertainty on milk supply in terms of quantity and input costs. Hence, uncertainty 
connected to transactions for milk between farmers and processors will increase for 
both farmers and processors. Asset specificity of dairy farmers becomes more 
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important as farmers scale up and specialize progressively. Relevant dimensions of 
transactions are the location of the farm which implies location specific investments 
and investments connected to dairy. Higher levels of asset specificity on farm level 
and higher levels of uncertainty will give more incentives both for farmers and 
processors to form hybrids with a higher level of control.  
 
Most dairy cooperatives have no additional advantage in managing milk quality and 
milk supply compared to investor owned firms as with numerous suppliers, free riding 
of individual farmers is possible. Both depend for securing their milk supply on local 
farmers delivering milk to their facilities. Alternatively, an unbalance in supply and 
demand could disproportionally affect the performance of individual farmers and the 
cooperative. It might be beneficial for an individual farmer to deliver additional milk 
to the cooperative as revenues from milk sales will increase. This additional milk 
supply might induce an unbalance between milk supply and demand, which 
eventually negatively affects the milk price paid out to farmers. But when the 
decrease in profit induced by the lower milk price is less than the increase in profit 
induced by the increase in milk supply, the individual farmer still faces an increase in 
profit. Chain integration could go a step further in Bulgaria compared to the 
Netherlands and France given the institutional environment that is not expected to 
guarantee milk quality and the focus on the export of milk. 
 
The analysis is subject to some qualifications. Firstly, in the case study areas only 10-
15 experts and stakeholders have been interviewed. These numbers are limited. 
However, the interviews enable us to make a comparison between case study areas 
and to focus on governance. Secondly, the interviews were conducted in the second 
half of 2009, when EU milk prices were at historical low levels. This might have 
influenced the expectations of the respondents. Thirdly, transaction costs themselves 
have not been measured. In addition, no detailed (hypothetical) contracts were 
analysed. This could lead to biases because of differences in interpretation. Finally, 
other factors, e.g. general economic developments and preferences about contract 
terms like contract duration and payment levels also play a role in contract choice.  
 
Despite the qualifications this research contributes to the existing literature because it 
gives insight in how governance changes between dairy processors and farmers in 




The research reported in this paper was funded by the European Commission within 
the project “Assessing the multiple Impacts of the Common Agricultural Policies 
(CAP) on Rural Economies” (CAP-IRE), 7
th Framework Program, contract n. 216672 
(www.cap-ire.eu). However the paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the EU 
and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area. 
This research is further part of the strategic research program "Sustainable spatial 
development of ecosystems, landscapes, seas and regions" and is funded by the Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Food Quality. 
 
 




ARGYRES, N.S., PORTER LIEBESKIND, J. (1999). Contractual commitments, bargaining 
power and governance inseparability: Incorporating history into transaction cost 
theory. Academy of Management Review 24 (1): 49-63. 
 
BACHEV,  H. (2007). Post-communist transition in Bulgaria—Implications for 
development of agricultural specialization and farming structures. In: Proceedings, 
EU COST A35 Programme for the Study of European Rural Societies Workshop 
“The management of rural land, Agricultural specialization and rural patterns of 
development”, Rennes University, Rennes. 
 
BARZEL, Y. (1982), Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets. Journal of 
Law and Economics 25(1): 27-48. 
 
BOUAMRA MECHEMACHE, Z., RÉQUILLART, V., and JONGENEEL, R. (2008). Impact of 
a gradual increase in milk quotas on the EU dairy sector. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 35(4): 461–491. 
 
BEKKUM, O.F. VAN, and NILSSON, J. (2002). Liberalization of International Dairy 
Markets and the Structural Reform of European Dairy Cooperatives. Netherlands 
Institute for Cooperative Entrepreneurship (NICE) Universiteit Nyenrode, The 
Netherlands. 
 
BENHAM, L. (2005). Licit and illicit responses to regulation. In MÉNARD, C. and M.M. 
Shirley (eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Dordrecht: 591- 
608. 
COOK, M.L., P.G. KLEIN, and C. ILIOPOULOS  (2008). Contracting and Organization in 
Food and Agriculture. In: É. BROUSSEAU and J. GLACHANT New Institutional 
Economics: A guidebook. Cambridge University Press, UK:  292-304. 
COOTER, R., and ULEN, TH. (1997). Law and Economics. Second Edition, Addison-
Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts. 
 
DRIES, L., H. HARMGART, G. METTETAL, E. MIDIER, D. PRIKHODKO, and N. Zvekic 
(2008). A systematic analysis of the Agribusiness sector in Transition Economies: 
The Bulgarian Dairy sector. EBRD and FAO Publication. Wageningen, The 
Netherlands. 
 
EUROPEAN  COMMISSION (2009). EU Dairy Farms Economics Report 2008. 
Directorate L. Economic analysis, perspectives and evaluations. Brussel. 
 
EUROSTAT, 2008. From grass to glass; a look at the dairy chain. Luxembourg. 
 
FURUBOTN, E.G., and R. RICHTER (1997). Institutional and Economic Theory: The 
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. The University of Michigan Press. 
 
  14 
 
GONZÁLEZ-DIAZ, M. and L. VÁZQUEZ (2008). Make-or-Buy Decisions: A New 
Institutioinal Economics Approach. In: É. BROUSSEAU and J. GLACHANT  New 
Institutional Economics: A guidebook. Cambridge University Press, UK: 255-271. 
 
HENRIKSEN, I. (1999). Avoiding lock-in: Co-operative creameries in Denmark, 1882-
1903. European review of Economic History 3: 57-78. 
 
HOBBS, J.E. (2004). Markets in metamorphosis: The rise and fall of policy institutions. 
Role of institutions and rural markets. VAN HUYLENBROECK, G., W. VERBEKE, and L. 
LAUWERS,  Role of institutions in rural policies and agricultural markets (eds). 
Emerald Group Publishing, 2004: 199-210. 
 
HOFSTEDE, G., and R.R. MCCRAE (2004). Personality and culture revisited: Linking 
culture and traits. Cross-Cultural Research  38(1): 52-88 
 
HÖLMSTROM, B., and R.J. ROBERTS (1998). The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 73-94. 
  
JOSKOW, P.L., and J.E. PARSONS (2008). Lessons Learned From Electricity Market 
Liberalization. The Energy Journal 29(2): 9-42. 
 
LYONS, B.R. (1996). Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm 
contracts, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12(4): 27-52. 
 
MASTEN, S.E. (1996). Introduction. In: Masten, S.E. (ed.) Case Studies in Contracting 
and Organization. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford: 3-28. 
 
MÉNARD, C. (1995). Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? 
Disentangling some fundamental concepts. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, 28: 161-182. 
 
MÉNARD, C. (2000). Enforcement procedures and governance structures: what 
relationship. In: C. MÉNARD (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations; 
Perspectives from New Institutional Economics. Edward Elgar Cheltenham, 
UK/Northampton USA: 234-253. 
 
MÉNARD, C. (2007). Cooperatives: hierarchies or hybrids. In: K. KARANTININIS  and 
J. NILSSON (eds.), Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies: 1–17. 
 
MAF (MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD) (2007). Annual report on the state and 
development of agriculture. Sofia. 
 
NEERGAARD, H. and J.P. ULHØI (2007). Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods 
in Entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.  
 
NORTH, D.C. (1986). The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 142(1): 230-37. 
 
ONILAIT (2005). La transformation laitière française. Paris. 
 
  15 
 
OXLEY, J.E. (1999). Institutional Environment and the Mechanisms of Governance: 
The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure of Inter-firm Alliances. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organzation, 38(3): 283-309. 
 
PERROT, C., D. CAILLAUD, D. DÉSARMÉNIEN, A.C. DOCKÈS, A. GUILLAUMIN, and J.C. 
REUILLON (2009). France Latiere 2015: Vers un accentuation des contrastes regionaux. 
Institut d’Elevage, France. 
 
PZ (PRODUCTSCHAP ZUIVEL) (2009). Statistisch jaaroverzicht 2008. Zoetermeer. 
RAFAT, A.M.E. (2009). Econometric analysis of the performance of cooperatives and 
investor owned firms in the European dairy industry. PhD-thesis, Wageningen 
University , Wageningen. 
RAYNAUD, E. (2008) Governance Structure and Contractual Design in Retail Chains. 
In: É. BROUSSEAU and J. GLACHANT New Institutional Economics: A guidebook. 
Cambridge University Press, UK: 235-251. 
TACKEN, G.M.L., M. BANSE, A. BATOWSKA, C. GARDEBROEK, K. NESHA TURI, J.H.M. 
WIJNANDS and K.J.  POPPE (2009). The competiveness of the EU Dairy 
Industry.Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague, The 
Netherlands. 
 
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach. The American Journal of Sociology, 87(3): 548-577 
 
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
  
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1998). Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it 
Headed. De Economist, 146: 23-58. 
 
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (2002). The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From 
Choice to Contract. University of California, Berkeley, California. 
 
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (2004). Transaction Costs and Agriculture: An excursion. Role of 
institutions and rural markets. In: van Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W., Lauwers, L. 









Table I.1:  Milk quota (in 1000 tons) per quota year and over or undersupply of 
the quota per selected country 
  2000/2001  +/- %  2007/2008  +/- % 
The Netherlands  10,992.9  -0.8  11,114.0  +1.3 
France 23,832.2  -0.7  24,135.2  -1.4 
Bulgaria   n.a.  n.a.  893.7  -14.9 





Table  I.2:  Total number of milk processing companies, total turnover, total 
number of employees, companies categorized by number of employees 
and % milk processed by cooperatives in the case study areas in 2005. 
  The Netherlands  France   Bulgaria 
Total number milk 
processing companies 
260 1,462  411 
Total Employees in 1,000  10.5  60.3  8.1 
Total Turnover in 1,000 mln   7.2  24.1  0.2 
Processing companies with 
<20 employees  
220 1,150  n.a. 
Processing companies with 
20-49 employees 
10 130  n.a. 
Processing companies with 
49-200 employees 
25 130  n.a. 
Processing companies with 
>200 employees 
5 52  n.a. 
%milk collected and/or 
processed by cooperatives 
 
>90   43% milk 




Source: Eurostat, 2008; PZ (2009); Onilait (2005). 
 